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ARCH/GARCH models have been widely used to examine nancial markets data, but formal
explanations for the sources of conditional volatility are lacking. This paper demonstrates the
existence of GARCH e¤ects similar to those found in asset returns, in a standard asset pricing
model with heterogeneous agents. Evolutionary game theory describes how agents endogenously
switch between di¤erent forecasting strategies based on past forecast errors. We show conditions
under which agents agree on the fundamental forecast and those where agents adopt strategies that
use extraneous information. Divergence from agreement on fundamentals could lead to periods of
high volatility in prices and returns. Econometric tests of simulated data show the existence of
GARCH e¤ects, we examine the impact of changes in the model parameters.
The goal of volatility analysis must ultimately be to explain the causes of volatility.
While time series structure is valuable for forecasting, it does not satisfy our need to
explain volatility. .... Thus far, attempts to nd the ultimate cause of volatility are not
very satisfactory.
- Robert Engle [2001]
Few models are capable of generating the type of ARCH one sees in the data. .... Most
of these studies are best summarized with the adage that "to get GARCH you need to
begin with GARCH."
- Adrian Pagan [1996]
1 Introduction
ARCH/GARCH models have been widely used for estimating and forecasting time series with
conditional volatility. These models have been used to describe the behavior of ination, interest
rates and exchange rates1, and they have become the standard tool for analyzing returns in nancial
markets (Engle [2001]). As the above quotes indicate, however, formal explanations of the sources
of conditional volatility have been elusive.
This paper demonstrates ARCH e¤ects using a game theoretic approach where agents endoge-
nously choose forecasting strategies. An evolutionary game theory mechanism describes how frac-
tions xt = (x1;t; :::; xk;t) of the population using forecasting strategies (e1;t; :::; ek;t) evolve according
to the performance of the strategies. The asset price is a function such that
yt = f (xt; Zt;t)
where Zt is the information set of the agents and t is a vector of stochastic elements that includes
dividends and other, possibly extraneous, shocks. A key observation is that the asset price yt
depends on the evolution of agents beliefs, represented by changes in xt as follows.
xt+1 = g(xt; yt; Zt)
1Bollerslev (2001) examined ination dynamics with a GARCH model. Engle, Lilien and Robins [1987] use the
ARCH in mean model to study yield curve issues. Diebold and Nerlove [1989] use a multivariate ARCH model to
analyze exchange rates.
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The conditional variance of the asset price can be written as
V (ytjZt) = h (xt; V (t))
that is, volatility depends on the state of agentsbeliefs and the magnitude of the shocks. Con-
ditional volatility arises when agents adopt strategies that propagate the variance of t to the
variance of yt for a number of periods.
ARCH e¤ects would not arise if agents settled on a single forecast, as many representative agent
models assume. Recent observations of the stock market suggest that changing beliefs is a driving
force behind the dramatic movements in asset prices, such as those seen in technology stocks.
We provide a particular example of such a process, focusing on three forecasting strategies that
satisfy rational expectations. The fundamentalist only uses expected future dividends. The mystic
also uses fundamentals but may also experiment with other extraneous information. The reectivist
forms the true mathematical expectation by using all the information about the other forecasts and
the state of the population. Agents switch to strategies that have shown lower forecast errors, and
an evolutionary dynamic of Hofbauer and Weibull [1996] allows us to parameterize how aggressively
they do so.
Standard econometric tests of the simulated data conrm the existence of ARCH and GARCH
e¤ects for certain standard deviations of the stochastic elements. For small shocks to dividends and
the martingale innovation, mysticism never increases its following and conditional heteroscedasticity
does not appear. However, as the magnitude of the shocks rise, the asset price shows occasional
bubble behavior and the returns data show ARCH and GARCH e¤ects for many of the simulations.
Similarly, if agents are slow to switch to better performing strategies, ARCH and GARCH e¤ects
are not present, but as agents become more aggressive, these e¤ects are increasingly common. We
also note that these e¤ects diminish when shocks to the dividends are very large and/or agents are
extremely aggressive. In this situation, there is so much noise in the returns process that detecting
ARCH and GARCH e¤ects is less likely.
Brock, Hommes and Wagener [2001] extend a standard mean-variance optimization model of
asset prices to an environment with heterogeneous agents.2 We adopt a similar approach, but
2Other studies with heterogeneous expectations include Chiarella [2002], Degrauwe [1993], Lux [1998] and DeLong,
Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann [1990]. Our study di¤ers in our focus on forecasts satisfying rational expectations.
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assume that agents know all the parameters of the model and stick to forecasts based on rational
expectations. LeBaron, Arthur and Palmer [1999] study the time series features of a simulated asset
market and show the existence of ARCH e¤ects and many other features of nancial markets data.
They use a computational approach with many trader types introduced throughout the simulation
according to a genetic algorithm. The dividend process in their model has serial dependence, which
may be a factor in the existence of conditional volatility, while dividends in the simulated model of
this paper are serially independent. Another advantage to our approach is our ability to compare
the merits of a small number of strategies that can be interpreted in standard economic models.
The focus on the possibility of heterogeneous forecasts in this paper stands in contrast to those
who argue that martingale solutions should be ruled out, according to criteria such as transversality
(see Cochrane [2001] p. 27), minimum state variable (McCallum [1983, 1997]), and expectational
stability (Evans and Honkapohja [1994, 2001]). Parke and Waters [2002] analyze conditions under
which the population is robust to the introduction of mysticism and the agents stick to forecasts
based on fundamentals and conditions where heterogeneity in the forecasts could persist. The
present paper presents a particular example of the class of models whose stability characteristics
are extensively analyzed in Parke and Waters [2002].
The convergence to rational expectations literature, such as the papers on least squares learning
of Marcet and Sargent [1989a, 1989b], is also related. Woodford [1990] and Howitt and McAfee
[1992] show the possibility of learning sunspot equilibria, which depends on accidental correlations
between sunspots and fundamentals, similar to the present work. These papers focus on agents
leaning model parameters over time, while our agents know the parameters and choose forecasts
that are based on multiple solutions to the model.
A paper that does have a formal model explaining conditional volatility in a di¤erent environ-
ment is the study of real interest rate uctuations in den Haan and Spear [1998]. They construct
on optimizing model where agents hold saving in the form of bonds. Agents are heterogeneous, as
in the present paper, and receive idiosyncratic shocks. Volatility clustering arises due to borrowing
constraints that vary across the business cycle.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the asset pricing model with
heterogeneous agents. Section 3 describes the di¤erent forecasts, shows how the asset price and
forecast errors are determined. Section 4 shows how agentschoices of strategies evolve over time.
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Section 5 reports the simulations results showing ARCH and GARCH e¤ects. Section 6 concludes.
2 Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous Agents
Brock, Hommes and Wagener [2001]3 extend a standard asset pricing model to the situation where
agents can have heterogeneous beliefs about future prices. Agents are myopic, mean-variance
optimizers who can choose between a risky asset and a riskless asset with gross rate of return R.
An agents wealth Wt evolves according to
Wt+1 = RWt + (yt+1 + ut+1  Ryt) zt
where the price of the risky asset is yt; the dividend payment is ut and zt is the number of shares
purchased by the agent in time t. The asset price and dividend process are stochastic so agents
does not have precise knowledge of yt+1 or ut+1 when making decisions about zt.
Agents may have heterogeneous expectations about an endogenous variable Xt. Let an agent
of type j have the expectation ej;t (Xt+1) formed at time t for the next period value Xt+1. Agents
of type j maximize the following objective over zt, where Vj;t denotes the conditional variance at





The parameter a denotes the level of risk aversion. Assuming that the conditional variance
Vj;t (Wt+1) = 
2
W is the same constant for all types and denoting the demand for shares of type j






ej;t (yt+1 + ut+1  Ryt) :
There is a constant supply of shares zs per investor and the fraction of the population of type
j is xj;t. Summing the demand over the n types and equating supply and demand yields the
3This model, which they refer to as the Adaptive Belief Sytem, was introduced in the technical literature in Brock
and Hommes [1999].
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xj;tej;t (yt+1 + ut+1)  C (1)
where C = a2W zs.
If agents are homogeneous and have rational expectations (1) becomes
yt = Et (yt+1 + ut+1)  C (2)







which corresponds to the present value model of asset pricing where  is the discount factor.





to equation (2) where mt is any martingale such that mt = mt 1 + t for some iid, mean zero
stochastic process t. Some argue for the exclusion of such solutions on the basis of a transversality
condition, but in a study of short term dynamics, we nd such criteria unpersuasive.
In the present approach agents use forecasting strategies based on the general solutions (4) to
(2). Agents agree on the expectations of future dividends so Etyt is common knowledge, but they
may disagree on the use of a martingale in making forecasts.
The key underlying assumptions of Brock, Hommes and Wagener [2001] used in the present
approach are the common beliefs about the dividend process and the constant conditional variance
of the asset prices. However, while Brock, Hommes and Wagener [2001] postulate a number of
di¤erent forecasting strategies, such as trend chasing or perfect foresight, we restrict ourselves to
forecasts based on the general solutions (4).
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3 Strategies
This section postulates three possible strategies for forecasting the asset price yt based on the
general solutions (4). The realization of yt is determined by the forecasts and the fractions of the
population using the di¤erent strategies. Determining yt allows the construction of forecast errors
for each strategy, which act as payo¤ in the evolutionary game theory dynamics.




Since the one period ahead expectations determine the current asset price, these forecasts of yt+1are
formed without knowledge of yt. Another fraction t of the population uses a mystic forecast based





One potential reasons agents might consider the mystic forecast is the existence of a spurious
(sunspot) variable that some agents believe a¤ects asset prices.
While both of the above forecasting strategies may be attractive to some, they do not use
all the information in this environment with heterogeneous forecasts. We postulate a a fraction
of the population t using a third strategy, the reective forecast e;t, which takes into account
the other forecasts and the fractions of the population using each. The asset pricing formula for
heterogeneous agents (1) with the above three forecasts yields
yt =  (te;t + te;t + te;t + Etut+1)  a2zs (5)
using the fact that agents have a common expectation about future dividends. The reectivist fore-
cast uses all available information to satisfy the asset pricing equation under rational expectations
(2) so it must satisfy
yt =  (e;t + Etut+1)  a2zs: (6)
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Combining (5) and (6), the reectivist forecast may be represented as






The reectivist forecast is an average of the other two forecasts, weighted according to their relative
popularity. The reectivist strategy is analogous to Keynes[1935] "beauty contest" interpretation
of predicting stock prices. Agents give primary attention to anticipating the choices of others as
opposed to the intrinsic value of the asset.
Agents choose forecasts based on past performance of the di¤erent strategies. As with many
evolutionary models4, we must specify the payo¤ to a strategy. Following LeBaron et. al. [1999],
agents judge strategies according to squared forecast error5. The forecasts described above deter-
mine the realization of the asset price, which in turn determine the forecast errors for each strategy.












Note that the reectivist forecast includes the martingale, weighted according to the popularity of
the mystic forecast, represented by nt. The fraction t; t; t and nt are determined once yt 1 is
realized and held constant until yt is determined. At time t, the updated fundamental solution
Ety

t+1 and martingale mt become available. Agents still do not know the contemporaneous price
yt, but can use the new information to form the following forecasts of yt+1.
4Blume and Easley [1992] discuss this point in the context of an evolutionary study of asset pricing. They are
concerned with long run survival of strategies.
5 In constrast, Brock, Hommes and Wagener [2001] use realized prots. While this is reasonable, accuracy of


















The negatives of the three period t squared forecast errors can be written as
;t =  U2t ; (8)
;t =  U2t   2ntUtAt   n2tA2t ; (9)
;t =  U2t + 2 (1  nt)UtAt   (1  nt)
2A2t ; (10)
where At =  tmt 1 is the level of the martingale term. The reective forecast






and a term involving the innovation in the martingale multiplied by the weight nt measuring
the importance of mysticism
Gt = 
 tnt(mt  mt 1):
Intuitively, Ut depends on serially independent shocks while At depends on the martingale, which
has autoregressive behavior.
In the payo¤s above, the third terms in the payo¤s to fundamentalism and mysticism (9) and
(10), referred to as martingale terms, is detrimental to each payo¤. However, the second term in
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each involves UtAt; referred to as covariance terms, are potentially benecial to one of the payo¤s
depending on the sign of UtAt.
Evolution of t; t and t depends on the tness of each strategy, which is the di¤erence between
each payo¤ and the population average payo¤ t = t;t+t;t+t;t. The reectivist strategy
has an intrinsic advantage in that is will always have non-negative tness, but it is possible for the
mystic or fundamentalist payo¤ to be the best. Using the payo¤s (8), (9) and (10) above, the
tness for reectivism is
;t   t =
tt
t + t
A2t  0: (11)
The covariance terms in (9) and (10) cancel in the population average payo¤, but the martingale
terms do not so the population average will always be worse than the payo¤ to reectivism.
Despite this property of reectivism, if the covariance term 2 (1  nt)UtAt in the payo¤ to
mysticism is positive and su¢ ciently large then ;t > ;t > ;t: If there are few followers of
mysticism, the sign of the covariance term depends on whether the martingale and dividend process
are positively correlated, so UtAt > 0 means that the mystic has conjured a fortuitously accurate
forecast.
These observations give some intuition about the interaction between the strategies. The
realization of the asset price (7) gives some insight into the potential e¤ect on the time series data.
If mysticism is eliminated, so that nt = 0, then the reective and fundamental forecasts are identical,
yt follows fundamentals and returns will be determined by dividends alone. However, if nt > 0
the martingale could inuence the asset price and lead it away the fundamental yt . Further,
if nt changes over time, both behaviors could be observed for di¤erent stretches of time. The
possibility of the price switching between fundamental and bubble behavior creates the potential
for the detection of ARCH e¤ects.
4 Evolution
This section describes a particular evolutionary framework based on the idea that agents imitate
the strategies of other successful agents6. Agents will switch to other strategies which have better
payo¤s, meaning lower forecast errors. We use a discrete time version of evolutionary dynamics.
6DeLong, Schleifer, Summer, and Waldman [1990] use imitation in their noise trader model.
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Let ri;t be the fraction of agents using forecast i who review their choice of strategy at time t; and
let pij;t be the probability that an agent using forecast j in period t who reviews switches to forecast
i in the next period. If there are k available forecasts, then the change in xi;t is given by





j;t   ri;txi;t: (12)
This is the discrete time version of equation (4.24) in Weibull (1997).7
All agents review every period regardless of the payo¤ so ri;t  1, but that the transition
probabilities pij;t depend on the performance of the strategies. Agent will tend to switch to other
strategies with better payo¤s, meaning lower forecast errors. Agents use payo¤weighting functions








w (h;t)xh;t. When the weighting function w () is linear wt corresponds to the
population average payo¤. The transition probability pij;t into strategy i depends on its cur-
rent weighted payo¤ w (i;t) relative to the population average wt and its current popularity xi;t.





The fraction using strategy i will obviously increase if its payo¤ i;t is large relative to the payo¤s
to the other strategies, but the dynamics of the system depend on the exact specication for w ().
The above evolution equation by itself shows that xi;t = 0 is steady state so if a strategy has
no followers it cannot acquire any. Avocates of minimum state variables require that all agents
use the fundamentalist strategy, while those persuaded by rational bubbles would think that all
agents use mysticism. The present paper takes a middle course, since each strategy has attractive
features. Pricing of assets based on fundamentals focuses on real events. Mysticism recognizes
the potential for large short term deviations in asset prices. Reectivism uses all the information
7Hofbauer and Weibull (1996, pp. 564-6) consider two specic behavioral models contained within this general
framework. Parke and Waters [2001] investigate both in depth.
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available to form a rational expectation. Therefore, we study the evolution of the system under
the following.
Condition 1 The fractions t,t and t do not fall below certain minimums min, min and min.
This condition is similar to the evolutionary game theory concept of drift, studied by Binmore,
Gale and Samuelson [1995], who analyze which strategies are robust to the introduction of small
fraction of the population using other strategies.
In practice, we choose a min to be much lower than the other minimums so that if mysticism is
near its minimum it has very little a¤ect on the asset price and yt essentially follows the fundamental
forecast8. Our goal is to nd out whether mysticism can gain su¢ cient following to impact the
system, causing bubble-like behavior and inducing ARCH e¤ects in the time series data.
Another element determinig the dynamics is the specication of the weighting function w ().
Parke and Waters [2002] shows that for a linear9 w () and bounded errors, reectivism is the
dominant strategy. For a convex weighting function, the conditions for agents to adopt the mystic
forecast improve. Convexity of ! () implies that agents are seeking out the best performing
strategy more aggressively. Compared to the replicator dynamic, convexity of the weighting
function means the population shares change overproportionally with the tness of the strategies10.
Let the weighting function be the following exponential form w () = e where  parameterizes the
convexity of the function. For higher , agents are switching to the best forecast more aggressively.
The evolution equation (14) and the payo¤s (8), (9) and (10) determine equations of motion for
the fractions of the population following each strategy. Using the exponential weighting function








< 1 implies that reectivisms share is increasing. This approximation demon-
strates the conditions under which t might decrease, giving mysticism a chance to succeed. If
8Parke and Waters [2001] relaxes this assumption on the minimum fraction following mysticism and provides a
more nuanced analysis of the stability of the system.
9This case corresponds to the replicator dynamic, the original evolutionary game theory model from biology.
Economists have developed a broader class of evolutionary models from foundations involving social interaction.
10Hofbauer and Weibull [1996] examine the specication of the weighting function in detail.
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the second order term 22nt (1  nt)A2tU2t is zero, then the equation corresponds to the linear
weighting case and t is monotone increasing. However, if the second order term is large enough
then t will fall. If the correlation between Ut and At favors mysticism as well, the share using
mysticism t will increase. Writing the approximation as
t
t+1
= 1  nt (1  nt)A2t [1  2U2t ];
t will fall if  and the magnitude of Ut is su¢ ciently large. So if agents are being aggressive and
the variance of the stochastic terms is high mysticism should have a chance to gain a following,
potentially drawing the price of the asset away from the fundamental forecast.
Reectivism has a natural advantage and will have a superior payo¤ to the population average
at all times. However, the mystic payo¤ can be superior if the covariance term in its payo¤
is su¢ ciently large and has the right sign. If, in addition, agents are actively seeking the best
forecasting strategy, many of them may switch to mysticism when its payo¤ is the best.
5 Simulations
Simulations of model with exponential weighting show conditions under which mysticism can gain
a following, potentially producing bubble behavior in the asset price. Econometric tests of the
simulated data demonstrate that the present model with agents switching between forecasts can
generate ARCH and GARCH e¤ects in the data for returns on the asset. If the variance of the
stochastic processes is su¢ ciently large and agents are aggressively seeking the best performing
strategy, then the asset price may deviate from the fundamental forecast and returns could display
ARCH properties.
Figures [1] and [2] show simulated realization for the model given by the evolution equation (14)
with exponential weighting w () = e and the payo¤s (8), (10) and (9) with di¤erent variances11
of the dividend process ut. The graphs also show the shares of the population using each strategy
across time. The fraction following mysticism t is the vertical distance from zero, while the fraction
following fundamentalism t is the distance from one. The gap between the two represents t, the
fraction using reectivism.
11The exponential weighting function parameter is set to  = 1 unless otherwise noted.
12
All simulation begin at the potentially stable point where reectivism has its maximum number
of followers. A small fraction " = 0:001 of the population using the mystic forecast is introduced
but at a much lower level than the minimums for the other strategies " = " = 0:05. The purpose
of setting a low " is so that e¤ect on the asset price realization, given by (7), is small when the
fraction following mysticism is near its minimum, since nt will also be low. Simulations in the
computational nance literature often introduce new strategies regularly during the simulation.
The model in this paper could be extended to include many di¤erent mystic forecasts operating
simultaneously, but we focus on a single mystic forecast for clarity. If the following for one mystic
forecast drops below the minimum, we allow t to remain at " and set the martingale such that
mt 1 = 0, representing a new mystic forecast.
Both simulations in Figures [1] and [2] have the same martingale innovation process12, but the
standard deviation of the dividend process u is set to the relatively low value u = 0:25 for the
simulation shown in Figure 1 while u = 1:25 in Figure 2. The two simulations show dramatically
di¤erent behavior. In Figure 1, when the standard deviation of the dividend process is small,
the population share for mysticism remains at its minimum and the asset price remains close to
the fundamental forecast. However, in Figure 2, when the dividend shocks are larger, there are
periods when mysticism succeeds in attracting adherents and becoming the dominant strategy at
times. Stretches of time when mysticism dominates often show bubble behavior in the asset price,
represented by the large deviations from zero in the fundamentalist forecast error. Such bubbles
never last indenitely. The existence of a minimum fraction following fundamentalism ensures
that the reective and mystic forecasts do not coincide and, as the martingale becomes large, the
reective forecast eventually outperforms the mystic forecast.13
Econometric tests conrm that the model produces time series features often associated with
nancial markets. ARCH and GARCH models are often used to analyze returns on assets. For
12Both the dividend process ut and the martingale innovation process t are distributed normally for these simu-
lations. The mean of the dividend process is 0.2 throughout. In Figures 1-2, the standard deviation of t,  = 0:5:
The evolution parameter  = 1 for both simulations as well.
13See Parke and Water [1999] for a full discussion of this issue. In some models of rational bubbles, such as Hall,
Psaradakis and Sola [1999] have, the bubble collapses with some exogenously given probability. The collapse in our
model occurs endogenously, given the assumption about the minimum fraction using fundamentalism.
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the present model returns are simply
RETt =
ut + yt+1   yt
yt
: (15)
Assuming markets are e¢ cient implies that returns should be serially independent and uctuate
about the mean. The dividend process is serially uncorrelated and distributed normally ut 
N(5; 2u)
14. As explained in section 2, agents are assumed to all have the same constant conditional




+ 2u which is the highest conditional
variance wealth could take if asset prices follow the fundamental solution. Of course if agents
expect bubbles, W could be higher, but as long as it is constant, there would be no qualitative
di¤erence in the results. More sophisticated agent could try to estimate an ARCH model every
period and try to anticipate changes in volatility, but this would only increase the serial correlation
in volatility. In our approach, ARCH e¤ects arise solely from heterogeneity in the forecasting
strategies.
5.1 ARCH
Observing the returns formula above (15) shows the potential for serial correlation in the squared
errors. Using the expression for the realized price (7), the di¤erence yt+1   yt will contain the
term  t 1mt (nt+1   nt). Since the evolution equation (14) implies that the fractions of the
population following di¤erent strategies are serially correlated, nt will be as well. This correlation
will be particularly pronounced when the mystic is gaining a following. The square of this term
will appear in the squared errors for the return so the presence of ARCH/GARCH e¤ect seems to
be quite possible.
We test sample runs of 1000 periods for the presence of heteroscedasticity in the returns. Table
1 shows results from applying Engles [1989] test, constructing the deviations "t of RETt from its
mean as follows.
RETt = RET + "t (16)





t 3; ::: . Each entry in the table shows the percentage of the sample runs, out of
14Other parameter values are a = 0:25;  = 0:99 and zs = 1:0.
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10,000 trials, that showed signicant (at the 99% level) serial correlation of the squared errors for
a given lag length and for various standard deviations of the dividends and martingale innovation.
The individual charts demonstrate the results for a given , and the last row gives the percent of
the runs which showed signicance in each of the rst ve lags.
A Monte Carlo analysis shows the percentage, above which the detected ARCH e¤ects are not
spurious. Performing the same test on white noise returns showed signicant ARCH e¤ect for
the rst lag in 0.0107 of the runs with a standard deviation of 0.0116. Invoking Chebyshevs
inequality, if ARCH e¤ects appear in more than the threshold of 0.0687 of the sample runs, they
are not spurious with a 99% probability. ARCH e¤ects at longer lags were even less frequent in
the case of white noise returns.
At lower levels of , ARCH e¤ects do not appear in more than this threshold fraction. The
small innovations lead to a small At term in the payo¤s, (8), (9) and (10), making the payo¤s similar
so there is little incentive to switch strategies. Furthermore, a small martingale will have relatively
little impact on the asset price and returns. At higher standard deviations of the dividends,
mysticism can gain a following even with small , but here the noise created by the dividends
tends to drown out the impact of mysticism on returns.
At higher levels of the standard deviation of the martingale innovation, conditions for the success
of mysticism and the appearance of ARCH e¤ects improves. As the magnitude of the shocks rise,
ARCH e¤ects rst occur when  = 0:5 and u = 1:0, where 0:1180 > 0:0687 of the runs had
signicant ARCH e¤ects at the rst lag. In addition, ARCH e¤ects in this case appeared at all
tested lags.
As  rises further, ARCH e¤ects become increasingly common. Larger shocks to the martingale
innovation increase the magnitude of the martingale in At as well as Ut opening the possibility that
the covariance terms in the payo¤s to mysticism and fundamentalism, (9) and (10), will play an
important role. The magnitude of the dividends remains important, however. At low u, such as
u = 0:5; signicant ARCH e¤ects do not appear for any , but for u = 1:0 they are present at
all   0:5. Larger shocks to ut raises the magnitude of Ut in the payo¤s helping to make the
covariance term bigger, which can help mysticism, bigger, in comparison to the martingale term,
which worsens the mystic payo¤.
However, for very large dividend shocks, ARCH e¤ects are diminished. For example, when
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 = 1:0, there are signicant levels of ARCH for u = 1:0 and 2:0 but not for u = 4:0, a pattern
which persists at higher levels of . Again, when dividend shocks are large, they can be the
dominant factor determining returns, and, since dividends are uncorrelated, returns are less likely
to exhibit serial correlation of any kind.
These tests clearly show that heterogeneity of forecasting strategies with agents choosing these
strategies endogenously can produce ARCH e¤ects in asset returns, as is commonly seen in the
nancial markets data. The combination of su¢ ciently large shocks to the martingale innovation
and moderate dividend shocks creates condition where mysticism can gain a following, bubbles can
form and serial correlation can appear in the squared errors of asset returns.
5.2 GARCH
A natural next step is to examine the simulated data that showed ARCH e¤ects to see whether
it is well represented by a GARCH model. GARCH (Generalized ARCH) models, introduced by
Bollerslev [1986], are commonly used to examine nancial markets data and o¤ers a useful extension
of the ARCH approach. GARCH models reduce the number of parameters estimated and allow
for serial correlation in both the squared errors and the conditional variance of the endogenous
variable, which separates short and long term variability in volatility.
We examine the simulated data using a GARCH(1,1) model that is often used with nancial




= 2R;t such that
2R;t = + '
2
R;t 1 +  "
2
t 1
so it depends on the previous periods conditional variance and squared errors. The advantage of
this specication is its parsimony, multiple lags of "2t are not required as in the ARCH test, and the
separation of the e¤ects of the long term conditional variance 2R;t 1 and the short term squared
errors "2t 1. Of course it is possible to include further lags of either variable, but, as Engle [2001]
notes, the GARCH(1,1) with one lag of each, has proved su¢ cient for most nancial markets data.
Table 2 reports the results of estimates of the GARCH(1,1) model of simulated data from the
model described in the previous subsection. Each chart in the table gives results for a given
15Bollerslev [1992] surveys ARCH modeling in nance.
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standard deviation of the martingale innovation while each row summarizes the results from 1000
sample runs of 1000 periods for a given standard deviation of the dividend process. The rst column
give u and second column (garch signif ) reports the percent of the runs where ' is signicantly
greater than zero16. The following column (arch signif ) shows the percent of the runs where  is
signicantly positive, among the sample runs where ' is signicant. The next two columns (garch
est and std garch est) show the average estimate of , among those that are signicantly positive,
and the standard deviation of the estimates, to give a sense of the variability of the parameter.
Similarly, the next two columns (arch est and std arch est) report the mean and standard deviation
of the estimated  s, from the sample runs where both  and  are signicantly positive. Finally,
we conduct a Ljung-Box Q test to see if the remaining residuals lacked serial correlation. The nal
column (diag) reports the percentage of the sample runs which showed no serial correlation of the
samples where  was signicantly positive, passing the diagnostic test.
The table shows that many of the sample runs that showed ARCH e¤ects are well represented
econometrically by a GARCH(1,1) model. In all cases, the percentage showing signicant GARCH
e¤ects (the estimate of ' > 0) is similar to the percentage that showed signicant ARCH e¤ects at
a single lag. Furthermore, the percent passing the diagnostic check for a lack of serial correlation in
the residuals is very high, always over 70% and over 90% in more than half the cases. Examination
of individual samples shows that some runs are better modeled by including a moving average or
autoregressive term or both in the returns equation (16), which is common with high frequency data
(see Enders [2004], p. 145). Combining the information in these columns (garch signif and diag)
gives a good estimate of the percentage of runs well represented by the GARCH(1,1) specication.
For example, for  = u = 1:0, the fraction showing signicant GARCH e¤ects is 0.459, and the
fraction of these passing the diagnostic test is 0.8998 so the product 0.413 is the faction with a
good t to the model. The estimates of ' tend to be large, over 0.5, for most of the sample runs
but estimates of the ARCH parameter  are often very small and/or insignicant. Such features
are also common to nancial markets data (Engle [2001]).
The results of the GARCH estimations show similar pattern to the table concerning the ARCH
tests. Higher levels of the standard deviation of the martingale innovation tend to show a greater
16To be counted, the returns also are required to show signicant ARCH e¤ects for one lag and the estimate of  
must be positive.
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frequency of signicant GARCH e¤ects. This observation is true for the standard deviation of the
dividend process, but as the level of u rises, GARCH e¤ects are less likely to appear. At high
levels of ; when GARCH e¤ect are common the adoption and subsequent rejection of mysticism
happens quite quickly. Mysticism can gain a large following but it usually last for less than 10
periods before it is rejected. Outbreaks of mysticism that last longer, as shown in Figure 2,
which tend to occur for more moderate  may or may not show GARCH e¤ects. A bubble that
forms slowly may show a small change in the volatility of the returns. These observations suggest
that ARCH and GARCH e¤ects are particularly prevalent when agents adopt a forecast that is
extremely divergent from fundamentals, but subsequently reject it quickly.
The result in Table 2 demonstrate that the present model, where agents have the option of
adopting a successful bubble forecast, can produce ARCH and GARCH e¤ects that are very similar
to those found in nancial markets. For large shocks in the martingale innovation and moder-
ate dividend shocks, a very signicant fraction of the sample simulations are well modeled by a
GARCH(1,1) process with parameter values that closely resemble those found in studies of nancial
markets data.
For some choices of parameters, GARCH e¤ects are quite common. For  = 2:0 and u = 1:0,
over two-thirds of the runs showed signicant GARCH e¤ects and passed the diagnostic test. An
example of one of these runs is shown in Figure 3. Volatility clustering in the returns is quite
evident and occurs around short outbursts of mysticism. Engle [2001] suggests that clusters of
large shocks must be the result of news, and we can interpret our simulations as agents temporarily
responding to a new variable but quickly discarding it as irrelevant. Any news, whether is matters
to future dividends or not, can have an impact if enough agents think it is important, even for only
a short period of time.
5.3 Agent Aggression
For mysticism to have the opportunity to gain a following, agents must be su¢ ciently aggressive
in switching to the best performing forecast. Such behavior is represented by the parameter
 in the exponential weighting function. Higher  has the e¤ect of placing greater weight on
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better forecasts17, meaning that a greater fraction will change their forecasting strategy to the
better forecasts, increasing the possibility that mysticism could draw so adherents from reectivism.
Therefore, an increase in  raises the probability that ARCH and GARCH e¤ects will be detected
in the simulated data, up to a point.
Table 3 shows very few sample runs18 with signicant GARCH e¤ects for  = 0:5, but for  = 2
and 4 over one third of the runs showed signicant GARCH e¤ects and passed the Q-test on the
residuals. Starting from low levels of , when agents are more aggressive, GARCH e¤ects are
more prevalent. However, for very high level of  = 8, for example, the frequency of GARCH
e¤ects falls. Examination of some samples19 shows that mysticism has not been driven out. On
the contrary, the fractions following mysticism and fundamentalism uctuate wildly, creating noisy
realizations for the asset price and returns, making conditional volatility e¤ects more di¢ cult to
detect.
6 Conclusion
ARCH / GARCH models have proved to be extremely successful econometric techniques for detect-
ing conditional volatility, particularly for returns in nancial markets. This paper shows a formal
model explaining how such e¤ects arise endogenously through agents choices of heterogeneous fore-
casting strategies. Agent switching to forecasts based on martingale solutions can produce bubble
behavior in the asset price and GARCH e¤ects in the returns.
Agents know all the parameters of the model and only use strategies satisfying rational expec-
tations. Their choice of forecast depends on the previous performance of the di¤erent strategies
based on forecast errors. An evolutionary game theory mechanism describes how the fractions
of the population using the di¤erent strategies change over time and allows comparisons of the
dynamics depending on how quickly agents change strategies.
The reectivist forecast, which uses the mathematical expectation of the asset price, has an
intrinsic advantage over the other strategies, but mysticism, which uses a forecast based on a
17The role of  here is similar to the search intensity parameter in the multinomial logit approach used by Brock,
Hommes and Wagener [2001]. See Parke and Waters [1999] for a discussion of the relative merits of the two
approaches.
18For these runs  = 0:5 and u = 1:0
19See Waters [2002] for numerous examples.
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martingale solution, can gain a temporary following under certain conditions. If the magnitude of
the shocks to dividends and the martingale innovation are large enough and agents are su¢ ciently
aggressive about switching to the best strategy, then mysticism can gain a following, the asset price
may be led away from the fundamental forecast and ARCH and GARCH e¤ect could appear in
the returns. The simulation results reported here conclusively demonstrate the presence of these
e¤ects in the model with endogenous switching between forecasting strategies.
As Engle [2001] notes, the source of conditional volatility must be news of some kind. Our
results suggest that the new information need not be relevant in any fundamental sense. If enough
investor beliive that a piece of information is important, it will be. The process of experimenting
with and rejecting sources of information is a key factor in the appearance of ARCH e¤ects. The
evolution of heterogeneous beliefs is key to understanding the behavior of nancial markets.
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